Unanimity is impossible. The rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form is all that is left. (Abraham Lincoln)

Introduction

In every society, there are people with different beliefs, values, and priorities, and each person is sure that they are right and the opposing views are wrong. For personal decisions involving private resources, individuals can decide independently. But how can we make decisions that affect the whole society? Societal matters, such as civil laws, foreign policies, economic regulations, and monetary policies, require one collective decision-making mechanism for everyone (Ostrom, 1990). One way to achieve the unity of decisions is the unity of the decision-maker. But we still need a collective decision-making mechanism to decide who the decision-maker is.

History and logic suggest three types of mechanisms for collective decision-making: no rule (anarchy), rule by a minority (despotism), and rule by the majority (democracy). Anarchy fails to provide the peace and order necessary for large societies (Nozick, 1974). Despotism raises the question of which minority should rule. Every minority wants to rule over the others. In practice, this gives power to the most violent group who can seize and maintain power through force – whether domestic tyrants or foreign occupiers.

Democracy, or the rule of the majority, emerges as the most legitimate and rational choice for collective decision-making, (Dahl, 1998). Derived from the Greek word 'dēmokratia' (rule by the people), democracy provides a peaceful and practical way to make decisions for societies with diverse beliefs and values. While the rule of the majority is not perfect, it is the super value and the foundational principle that should supersede other values and principles in any peaceful society (Sen, 1999 July). That said, this article outlines some of the safeguards and techniques that enhance and enforce the rule of the majority while protecting the minorities.

But the majority are not knowledgeable

Someone once said “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” Sure, most people may not have enough knowledge or expertise to make strategic and informed decisions, but they can elect (hire) experts and knowledgeable representatives to make such decisions on their behalf. In fact, the majority holds the supreme power and can use it directly or indirectly through representation. Let’s call it Representative Democracy.

Elected representatives are more competent than dictators because candidates must compete for people’s votes in elections, resulting in more competitive officials. Moreover, the majority-elected leaders have a larger pool of talented supporters to trust. This makes it easier to find and appoint more competent people for government positions. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) show that democratic leaders are around 20% more likely to be highly educated.

A more competent government makes better decisions and policies (Rodrik, 2000). For example, such governments make (or eliminate) better laws to facilitate foreign investment and international trade (Jensen, 2003; Büthe & Milner, 2008). They also try to improve the infrastructure for industries and businesses to survive and thrive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). These will result in higher returns on investments and thus more investments (Banerjee & Duflo, 2019).

Many government decisions and policies involve government spending and taxes. A competent democratic government tries to lower its expenses and reduce taxes, again allowing for higher returns on investment and thus more investments in the country (Alesina et al., 2019).

Furthermore, a competent democratic government establishes policies that result in more economic stability and lower risks for investors (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Established democracies rarely go to war with each other (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The European Union, built on democratic principles, has maintained peace among member states since its formation (Manners & Whitman, 2012).

Also, democratic governments tend to take better care of their citizens. They usually provide some level of social welfare to people in need (Acemoglu et al., 2019). This provides a safety net for small investors and entrepreneurs who may not afford high risks otherwise (Aghion et al., 2019). Democracies spend an average of 28% of GDP on social programs, compared to 18% in non-democracies (Adema et al., 2023). This has resulted in 5-7 years higher life expectancy in democratic nations (Bollyky et al., 2019).

Higher returns and lower risks incentivize more investments in the country (Li & Resnick, 2003). More investments result in more and higher-paid jobs and lower unemployment rates. More and better jobs attract skilled workers to stay in the country and build and innovate (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2019). Also, it can attract skilled workers to immigrate from other countries that have fewer job opportunities (Glennon, 2024). This creates a virtuous cycle of investment, growth, and prosperity.

More investments result in more production, creation, and innovation. Democratic societies often lead in innovation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2021). For instance, Taiwan's transition to democracy led to its rise as a global technology leader (Chu, 2012). Accordingly, democratic countries often perform better economically.

Armani (2024) explains different ways through which democratic mechanisms can result in more prosperity. Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships between the mechanisms, factors and outcomes.

Democracy Impacts — Figure 1: Hypothesized channels, through which democracy can help nations. (Armani, 2024)

But people make mistakes

Democracy would be ideal if people were all smart and made flawless decisions. However, when people make mistakes, democracy becomes absolutely essential because it allows them to correct their mistakes as they learn from them. This is an important element of democracy. People not only have the power to vote for officials but also the power to vote them out when they change their minds (Sen, 1999 Oct).

Dictators remain in power even after people change their minds. That is why dictators don’t care much about people’s well being. For example, Iran's current supreme leader came to power by the will of the majority, but now the will of the majority does not matter, because he stays in power for life, insulated from public accountability under the Constitution, whether people want him or not (Articles 110 and 111).

Elections would give power to the majority only if held regularly (Dahl, 1998). Democracy provides a peaceful avenue for the people to change the government without violence, revolution, and destruction (Sen, 1999 Oct). Democratic nations have significantly fewer internal conflicts than non-democracies (Gleditsch, 2020). This results in political stability, reliable property rights, and lower risks for long-term investments.

Moreover, freedom of speech and press enables people to criticize officials and inform the public about their performances. This, combined with regular elections, holds elected leaders accountable for their decisions (Sen, 1999 July). When officials know they can lose their positions in the next election, they tend to behave better, as incompetent and corrupt officials can be voted out of office. Countries with regular elections demonstrate increased government transparency and lower corruption levels (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007).

Some may argue that limiting the electorate’s choices to pre-vetted candidates ensures the selection of qualified representatives and prevents the election of unqualified individuals. While this idea appears appealing in theory, it relies on the existence of impartial and trustworthy gatekeepers to conduct such vetting purely based on qualifications, devoid of self-interest. In practice, history demonstrates that those empowered to limit electoral choices often exploit this authority to serve their own interests rather than those of the people (Gehlbach & Simpser, 2015).

For instance, in Russia, electoral processes are marked by the disqualification of opposition candidates under the pretext of legal or procedural violations, effectively ensuring the dominance of pro-Kremlin figures (Ross, 2011). Similarly, in Iran, the Guardian Council has interpreted (altered) the constitution (article 99) in a way to authorize itself to bar electoral candidates. Their stated justification is to “protect” the electorate by disqualifying “unqualified candidates.” However, they have used this power consistently to exclude opposition candidates and consolidate their grip on power, leaving voters with a narrow pool of low quality candidates aligned with the council’s interests.

These examples illustrate how restricting electoral choices often undermines democratic principles, leaving voters with options that may not represent their interests, values or priorities. True democracy lets the majority decide who is qualified to represent them. Of course, the majority are free to make mistakes and learn from their mistakes.

But who enforces democracy?

In practice, democracy is more complicated to implement and sustain. Many regimes claim to be “democratic,” but they are in effect autocratic or oligarchic. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Islamic Republic of Iran are just a few examples.

When power is concentrated, the ruling party can undermine elections in various formal and informal ways. Election fraud, excluding opposition candidates, suppressing opposition voters, and imprisoning political opponents are just a few tactics used to stay in power, despite not representing the majority (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Ross, 2011; Corrales, 2020; Gel'man, 2021).

Venezuela's democracy under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro represents an important example, characterized by what some scholars describe as "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Corrales, 2020). The regime systematically undermined democratic institutions by manipulating electoral rules, controlling media, intimidating opposition, and using constitutional reforms to concentrate power, effectively transforming Venezuela's democratic system into an autocratic regime.

Putin’s presidency in Russia is another example. According to Gel'man (2021), Putin's Russia is a "managed democracy" where the ruling party systematically undermines democratic processes by controlling electoral legislation, media narratives, and political competition, creating an authoritarian system that maintains a democratic facade while preventing meaningful political alternatives. The power changed hands within the ruling party between Putin and Medvedev in 2008 and 2012. And later on, they amended Russia’s constitution (article 81) to extend the time limit for Putin.

To ensure the integrity and inclusivity of elections, the power should be distributed among independent branches (Madison, Federalist No. 47, 2009). This separation of powers creates a system of checks and balances that enables different branches and sections of the government to control each other and prevent tampering with the elections, time limits and the courts (Madison, Federalist No. 51, 2009). This system results in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, where no one can benefit by deviating from it (Khaledi, 2018).

Independent courts are necessary to interpret the laws reasonably and enforce them upon those in power. Otherwise, the ruling party finds a way around the law to stay in power (Linz & Stepan, 1996). An independent judiciary holds government officials accountable for their actions and limits corruption in government. It can also protect citizens who criticize the officials, thereby holding the officials more accountable. South Korea's impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 shows how democratic systems with independent courts can remove corrupt leaders (Mosler, 2020).

Conversely, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) exercises full control over the central and provincial courts in North Korea, demonstrating the absence of judicial independence in authoritarian regimes. This enables the Workers’ Party of Korea to suppress any opposition through arbitrary arrests, show trials, and severe punishments (Kirby, 2014). This perpetuates corruption, undermines human rights, erodes property rights and thereby discourages investment.

Interestingly, time limits and regular elections deter those in power from undermining judicial independence or concentrating power, as their opponents can eventually hold power in the future. For example, in the United States, the ruling party respects judicial decisions even when these decisions oppose its interests (Ginsburg & Huq, 2018).

Judges, however independent, could still be biased (Guthrie et al., 2002). We need to constrain judicial discretion by requiring their decisions to be strictly based on laws, statutes and precedents (Waldron, 2021). An independent judiciary with restricted power interprets and enforces the laws and contracts impartially and treats every party equally. That results in more reliable property rights and stronger enforcement of contracts, thereby creating a level playing field for businesses to compete on (Acemoglu et al., 2001). This, in turn, reduces risks and encourages more investments.

In fact, the ideal judge decides like a machine with no emotion or bias. Fortunately, Artificial Intelligence is becoming more and more powerful and can eventually replace human judges (Davis, 2018). Today, AI serves primarily as a judicial assistant, analyzing precedents and handling routine matters while human judges oversee complex cases (Surden, 2019), but its capabilities are expanding exponentially. AI offers increasingly powerful tools for enhancing judicial decision-making, particularly for routine cases (Re & Solow-Niederman, 2019). While current AI systems face challenges with complex social context and competing principles (Pasquale, 2020), their rapid advancement suggests a transformative future for the judiciary.

Peters (2022) argued that AI systems can inherit biases from their training data and design choices, making the goal of purely "unbiased" automated justice questionable. However, the challenge of AI bias is becoming increasingly manageable with new techniques like reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) and advanced calibration methods (Christiano et al., 2023; Ojeda et al., 2023).

As these systems continue to evolve, they may surpass human judges in their ability to process vast amounts of legal precedents, maintain perfect consistency across cases, and render decisions free from human emotional biases, fatigue, or external pressures. Therefore, in the future, AI might handle most court decisions, while human judges focus on developing laws and ensuring the system remains aligned with society's values and ethical principles.

In addition to being impartial and incorruptible, an AI judge can be faster and more accurate than human judges. Studies have shown that the speed and efficiency of the judiciary are significant drivers for investment and economic growth (Kapopoulos & Rizos, 2023; Bosio, 2025).

AI may also replace top officials in the executive and legislative branches. Since AI (still) lacks self-interest, it is more trustworthy than human politicians. In fact, its use eliminates all problems with agency conflicts and moral hazard. However, to employ AI for legislation, policy-making, and decision-making, we must define clear and proper objectives for those tasks. Essentially, AI is an optimizer, and its optimization goals must be set by humans. These goals could include a combination of economic indicators, such as GDP, employment growth, and venture capital investment. Ultimately, it is up to the majority to determine the objectives for AIs in charge. Also, the majority should decide who controls the devices and computers that host the governing AIs.

Blockchain technology offers transparent, tamper-resistant mechanisms for enforcing democratic governance processes (Armani, 2023). Blockchains can execute smart contract codes that automatically enforce governance rules without human intervention (Buterin, 2014, Khaledi, 2018). This automation can prevent election fraud and enhance integrity in democratic processes by making the votes publicly verifiable while maintaining voter privacy and anonymity via cryptographic techniques (Ayed, 2017; Zhang et al., 2018). Armani (2025) has designed and implemented a smart constitution as a smart contract for an interim government. It illustrates the potential of blockchain-based democratic governance.

Blockchain technology can also dramatically reduce election costs and improve efficiency by allowing citizens to vote securely from their devices. These significant cost savings enable us to hold separate elections for different branches of government, including direct presidential elections rather than having the legislature select a prime minister. This separation ensures true independence between branches, creating stronger checks and balances and preventing any one group from accumulating too much power. A directly elected president, operating independently from the legislature, can more effectively serve as a counterbalance and represent the people's interests directly, rather than being beholden to parliamentary coalitions.

Blockchain-based voting systems face some challenges. For example, once deployed to the network, smart contracts are immutable and cannot be easily corrected if they have any bug or vulnerability (De Filippi et al., 2020). Also, while smart contracts excel at enforcing straightforward rules like time limits or voting procedures, they lack the capacity to interpret context or handle nuanced decisions requiring judgment in unexpected situations (Reijers et al., 2021). Moreover, issues like digital identity, voter authentication, and equitable access to technology must be addressed to ensure inclusive participation in blockchain-based governance systems (Wessling et al., 2018).

But society should be assertive and engaged

Some scholars emphasize that we need an engaged citizenry, a culture of accountability, and a mobilized, vigilant and assertive society in order to hold the people in power accountable and keeping democracy alive (Dahl, 1989; Putnam, 1994; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019).

However, historical examples suggest that institutional design may play a more decisive role. For instance, during the founding of the United States in 1776, most Americans were not deeply engaged in national politics, yet the founding fathers crafted a federal republic with robust checks and balances that has endured for over two centuries (Ackerman, 1991; Elster, 1995). This demonstrates how well-designed institutions can create a stable democratic framework, even in the absence of widespread societal engagement.

On the other hand, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 illustrates how a flawed constitutional design can undermine even a highly mobilized and vigilant society. Despite the Iranian people’s assertiveness and resilience, critical loopholes in the constitution—such as Articles 98 and 99—allowed unelected bodies like the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council to consolidate power, leading to a new form of despotism (Arjomand, 1988; Abrahamian, 1993). And in the past decades, despite the persistent assertiveness and resilience of Iranian society, the regime’s despotism and oppression has only intensified over time (Axworthy, 2013). This highlights the limitations of societal engagement when institutional mechanisms fail to prevent the concentration of power.

In my view, achieving liberty and prosperity is largely an engineering endeavor centered on designing effective systems of checks and balances. A well-crafted democratic constitution with proper control mechanisms can create a durable framework for accountability and limit the concentration of power (Lijphart, 2012). Such a constitution requires foresight in anticipating abuses, balancing institutional strength with flexibility, and ensuring adaptability to changing circumstances. While designing a good constitution is challenging, it is a necessary step towards liberty and prosperity.

Furthermore, well-designed institutions can foster a culture of accountability and encourage civic participation and social engagement (Rothstein, 2005), as seen in the U.S. Bill of Rights, which protects freedoms essential for organizing and holding leaders accountable (Dahl, 1998).

In fact, the main point of democracy is to reduce the societal vigilance and engagement needed for political change. Democracy should provide proper control mechanisms and constitutional checks and balances to ensure accountability without relying on constant societal vigilance and assertiveness. However, under flawed constitutions and authoritarian regimes, the only way to change the rules and rulers is through costly societal engagement and mobilization like in civil wars or revolutions.

The true measure of democracy lies in how effectively and efficiently institutions enable the majority to monitor, control and replace those in power. Ultimately, the key question is how costly it is and how long it takes for the majority to replace the leaders when they decide to do so.

But what about the tyranny of the majority?

Democracy lets 51% of people decide for 100% of people and 100% of resources. This can result in the tyranny of the majority (Guinier, 1994). Fortunately, the concepts of “majority” and “minority” are not static but issue-specific; individuals may find themselves in the majority on one issue and in the minority on another. This dynamic nature of the majority rule ensures that most citizens will often be part of the majority (Page & Shapiro, 1992). With every decision or policy, some people agree, some people disagree and some people are indifferent. The distribution of people’s opinions changes from decision to decision.

Nonetheless, it is possible that occasionally for some decisions or policies, the majority takes advantage of a minority. For example, investors can be considered a minority when deciding on capital gain taxes. Socialism is a prominent example of how populist policies undermine property rights and destroy incentives for investment (Stiglitz, 2000).

To minimize the possibility of the tyranny of the majority, we need to limit the power of the majority-elected government. Federalism authorizes local governments to make most of the decisions on local matters instead of having the majority of the country decide for all the nation (Lijphart, 2012). This limits the power of the federal (central) government, however democratically elected. Therefore, on average, a higher percentage of people will be happy with their choices.

While federalism advocates for autonomy at the local level, liberalism advocates for autonomy at the individual level, asserting that people should be free to make personal decisions as long as they do not harm others (Riker, 1982). To maximize freedom, we need to minimize government intervention and regulatory constraints (Held, 2006). Nozick (1974) argues that the state's role should be limited to protecting individual rights without unnecessarily constraining personal choices.

A republic is a form of democracy that limits the power of the elected government to essential duties to protect minorities while the majority still holds the ultimate power (Lijphart, 2012). It allows people to make decisions for themselves in a free market as long as those decisions do not infringe on others' rights. A republic has a system of checks and balances to protect each citizen’s natural rights against the (local or federal) government, however democratically elected (Madison, Federalist No. 51, 2009).

Nevertheless, ultimately, it is still the majority that should determine which decisions fall under the purview of the federal government, local governments, or individual autonomy. However, it is usually in the best interest of the majority to limit governmental power. That is because the composition of the majority changes and depends on the issue at hand. While a large and intrusive government may serve your interests on one issue, on another, you could find yourself among the minority with little or no representation in the government.

But not every vote is created equally

One may argue that voting should be weighted based on voters’ knowledge and intelligence. However, measuring such characteristics is subjective and prone to bias. Who determines which individuals possess more knowledge and whose votes should carry more weight? Whoever is given such a power would likely use it to favor those aligned with their own interests. Furthermore, as Friedrich A. Hayek (1974) pointed out, centralizing decision-making based on subjective measures of knowledge often leads to a “pretense of knowledge,” where those in power impose flawed judgments, ignoring the complexity of decentralized systems and the diversity of perspectives.

Another approach is to weight votes based on individuals’ stakes in the outcome, as in corporate governance. In corporations, the investments determine the shareholders’ stakes in the outcome. However, in many corporations, this approach has empowered incumbent managers rather than shareholders (Bebchuk, 2007; Armani, 2020).

Furthermore, determining stakes in a country is far more complex and subjective. If voting power is based on property ownership (aristocracy) or tax contributions (plutocracy), it risks empowering a small elite to dominate resources and decisions, perpetuating even more inequality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). It becomes vulnerable to the tyranny of a minority, which is much worse than the tyranny of the majority. In fact, any weighting scheme makes the system more vulnerable to the tyranny of a minority. As we know from 51% attacks, the least vulnerable and most equitable system remains one person, one vote (Narayanan, 2016). Generally, the most equitable approach is the most fair one (Dahl, 1989).

Figure 2 illustrates different weighting schemes to distribute voting power among members of the society.

That said, fortunately, under free speech, individuals with greater knowledge and higher stakes in the future of the nation are more likely to influence the majority to cast more informed votes. In this way, a pure equal democracy inherently amplifies the weight of well-informed opinions, without requiring formal vote weighting.

Weighting Votes Schemes — Figure 2: Normalized weights for votes based on the stakes in the country

But career politicians game the system (entrenchment)

In legislatures around the world, career politicians often use strategies to hold onto power for several terms. They establish donor networks to secure the votes they need, making it difficult for new candidates with fresh ideas to compete (Jacobson, 2019). This creates an exclusive political class that instead of representing the public serves the interests of wealthy donors and special interest groups (Gilens & Page, 2014). These entrenched political positions undermine democracy by creating significant obstacles to political renewal and fair representation.

Fortunately, there is a solution. To cope with this problem, the constitution can ban consecutive terms for representatives. It forces regular turnover and ensures rotation in public office while still allowing experienced politicians to return after a break if people decide to bring them back.

Term limit restrictions reduce the incumbents' unfair advantage, making elections more competitive and giving new candidates a better chance (Carey, 1996; Kurtz, 2007). This can promote diversity in leadership, allowing more people from different backgrounds to serve (Smart & Sturm, 2013). It also reduces corruption by preventing politicians from becoming too powerful (Bucchianeri, 2025; Carey et al., 2000). Moreover, many representatives spend a lot of time and effort on short-term goals and campaigning to secure re-election (Mayhew, 2004). Banning consecutive terms encourages representatives to focus on long-term goals and on their actual jobs rather than campaigning.

Some critics argue this sacrifices legislative experience. However, Costa Rica proves that preventing power entrenchment is worth the tradeoff (Lehoucq, 2010). Costa Rica’s constitution prohibits legislators (deputies in the Legislative Assembly) from serving consecutive terms (Article 107). It regularly welcomes new voices while still benefiting from experienced leadership. It creates genuine opportunities for new leaders while maintaining a balanced mix of fresh perspectives and seasoned expertise.

But representatives tend to over-legislate

While some regulations address legitimate public interests, such as safety and environmental protection, evidence suggests that many regulations do not prioritize public welfare (Stigler, 1971). Notably, less democratic and more interventionist governments, often characterized by excessive bureaucratic agencies, tend to impose more regulations, particularly anti-competitive ones (Djankov et al., 2002).

Even democratically elected representatives sometimes enact excessive laws and regulations in an effort to appease constituents. Over time, this gradual expansion of government power can erode individual freedoms (Hayek, 1944). To foster greater freedom, stimulate economic activity, and encourage investment and growth, regulations should be restricted to the minimal level that is necessary (Friedman, 1962). Two constitutional provisions could help with this.

First, the constitution should mandate a sunset clause for every law so that it expires after a set period, such as 10 years (Elinor, 1990). This is more democratic because the majority composition changes over time and the majority in one period should not decide for the people in another period. Not only population demographics change, but also people change their minds and societal values change.

As an example, the Texas Constitution indirectly enforces sunset clauses through the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, which periodically reviews state agencies and their laws to determine if they should continue to exist. While the U.S. Constitution does not mandate sunset clauses, it includes provisions to check on government power, like the Appropriations Clause (Article I, Section 9), requiring military appropriations to be renewed every two years, effectively functioning as a periodic review.

Second, the constitution should require a supermajority (e.g. 67%) to enact new laws or establish government agencies, while allowing a simple majority to repeal laws, abolish programs or consolidate agencies (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). This approach would slow government expansion, while facilitating its reduction and elimination of unnecessary laws, thereby moving towards a leaner government. However, the optimal level for supermajority requirement is yet to be determined.

As a relevant example, amending the US Constitution requires a supermajority (two-thirds in Congress and ratification by three-fourths of states), but overturning laws passed under a constitutional amendment often requires only a simple majority in Congress. Also, the U.S. Senate often requires a supermajority (60 votes) to overcome a filibuster and pass significant legislation. However, repealing laws typically requires a simple majority, particularly through budget reconciliation processes.

A consequence of excessive legislation is higher government spending that results in higher inflation (Friedman, 1968; Sargent & Wallace, 1981). Alesina and Summers (1993) show that an independent central bank (i.e. Federal Reserve) can control inflation to some extent. But it is difficult to make the central bank truly independent. As a more innovative solution, a blockchain-based monetary system could potentially replace the central bank and regulate the money supply through predetermined formulas and algorithms, eliminating discretionary interventions and political influence (Ammous, 2018; Armani, 2021).

But many representatives become corrupt (kleptocracy)

Corruption exists in almost every government, but under democratic governments, the free press and free speech enable the dissemination of information and the exposure of wrongdoing. In contrast, authoritarian regimes often shroud transactions involving officials in secrecy, making it exceedingly difficult to uncover corruption and embezzlement (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Also, when corruption is widespread, many people participate in it to some extent and, as a result, do not oppose it, even though it has devastating effects on the economy and everyone would be better off without it (Mauro, 2002; Rothstein, 2005).

Democratic systems can control and prevent corruption through several mechanisms. Accountable representatives and elected legislators are more likely to pass robust anti-nepotism and anti-favoritism laws to promote ethical governance and prevent conflicts of interest (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Such laws should explicitly prohibit the hiring of relatives of government officials within government roles and ensure transparent recruitment processes based on merit. The laws must include measures that prevent preferential treatment in awarding contracts, promotions, and other official decisions. However, authoritarian regimes depend on favoritism and nepotism for survival, and thus oppose such laws (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011).

Constitutional provisions can include anti-corruption mechanisms such as independent oversight bodies and mandatory disclosure requirements for top government officials, elected or appointed. Such provisions could mandate the public release of all financial transactions involving government officials, legislators and judiciary members. That includes donations, gifts, investment holdings, and sources of income while holding government positions (Chang et al., 2021).

To further improve transparency, accountability, and efficiency in government spending, some laws or provisions can require government officials to use a blockchain for all government transactions and expenditures. This can foster public trust, prevent fraud, and ensure that taxpayer funds are spent responsibly (Kshetri, 2021). Blockchain's decentralized and immutable nature creates a permanent, transparent, and publicly traceable record of government funds, which can be accessed by citizens and auditors to hold officials accountable (Alotaibi et al., 2025).

Using blockchain technology and measures like mandatory disclosure can help detect corruption quickly. When discovered, each case typically reveals specific methods and patterns of misconduct. Since similar schemes may be operating undetected elsewhere, each corruption discovery should trigger a comprehensive nationwide investigation. To ensure accountability, all court sessions involving government officials must be conducted publicly. Furthermore, each corruption case exposes vulnerabilities in existing laws and oversight mechanisms. The legislature must then strengthen related regulations and mechanisms while eliminating legal loopholes that enable misconduct, thereby preventing similar corruption schemes from recurring.

But what about special interest groups? (protectionism)

Established market participants and other special interest groups frequently lobby legislators and policymakers to enact protectionist laws, which suppress competition and create barriers to market entry. These regulations tend to disproportionately benefit a few at the expense of the broader public (Stigler, 1971; Mercuro & Medema, 2006). They enable politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists and those in power to seek rent, extract bribes or exploit their control over market access (Krueger, 1974). In fact, any politician advocating for anti-competitive legislation should be suspected of corruption.

Empirical evidence across countries shows that stricter regulation of market entry is correlated with more corruption and a larger unofficial economy, but not with a higher quality of goods or services in the private or public sector (Johnson et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2002). Such regulations can function as extractive institutions that stifle innovation and investment, thus driving up prices, reducing service availability, and harming consumers and the very people they purport to protect (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Particularly, less democratic governments tend to exhibit greater levels of protectionism, favoritism and systematic bias toward state-connected enterprises and established incumbents (Djankov et al., 2002; Faccio, 2006). That is because Authoritarian regimes face fewer institutional constraints on granting favors and are not accountable to the broader population. Rather, they rely on a small “selectorate” of key supporters, and reward them with exclusive economic privileges and market protections to sustain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005). This leads to significant market inefficiencies, as autocrats have to prioritize loyalty over economic efficiency. Some scholars argue that authoritarian leaders may even strategically maintain international tensions to justify protectionist policies and economic isolation that benefit their support base (Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2010).

Tariffs are a classic example of protectionist policies designed to shield some domestic industries from foreign competition, at the expense of consumers and the broader economy (Krugman et al., 2011). For instance, in Iran, high tariff barriers on imported vehicles — reaching up to 175% — have been implemented to protect inefficient domestic car manufacturers from international competition (Bjorvatn & Selvik, 2008). This is due to the dominance of state-affiliated organizations and politically connected businesses in key sectors, including the automotive industry (Harris, 2013).

Dual exchange rate systems are yet another example of destructive economic interventions by authoritarian regimes. For instance, Venezuela's currency control system (CADIVI) set the official exchange rate at 6.3 bolivars per US dollar, while the black market rate soared to 60 bolivars per US dollar (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2007). The government gave favored businesses privileged access to dollars at the low official rate. They could import using the cheap dollars, while competitors struggled to operate (Corrales & Penfold, 2015). As a result, business success became heavily dependent on political connection rather than quality, efficiency, or innovation.

While democratic governments are often less protectionist, they are not immune to the influence of special interest groups and market incumbents. Even in democracies, dominant market players and donors try to lobby the elected lawmakers and policymakers to protect their interests (Stigler, 1971).

Many democratic institutions have banned or restricted ride-sharing apps like Uber to shield local taxi drivers from competition. New York's taxi medallion system is a prominent example of such protectionist policies designed to limit market entry and protect incumbent taxi services (Suska, 2016). While proponents argue that such measures address safety and consumer protection concerns (Wallsten, 2015), evidence suggests that their primary objective is to safeguard the market position of established players (Cramer & Krueger, 2016). Similarly, regulations imposing high taxes or excessive restrictions on Airbnb rentals are often designed to protect local hotel chains (Zervas et al., 2017). Generally, occupational licensing requirements, while appearing to ensure service quality and protect consumers, primarily serve to restrict market entry and protect incumbents, with no positive effect on service quality (Kleiner, 2006).

Unions initially emerged to protect workers, improve working conditions, and reduce unfair inequality (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). However, once laws granted them monopoly protections and mandated membership, they began to shield underperforming employees from competition and compress wage differentials (Card et al., 2004). Effectively, they stifle competition, discourage skill development, and reduce productivity. Overall, union monopolies create inefficiencies and increase employer costs, which results in fewer employment opportunities and slower economic growth (Friedman, 1962; Lazear, 2009).

Many democratic countries have antitrust laws to prevent monopolistic behavior. However, sometimes special interest groups and politicians can weaken or bypass antitrust laws with the help of lobbyists and donors (Hovenkamp, 2005; Baker, 2019). More importantly, it is often the government regulations that create monopolies by setting up entry barriers in the first place (Djankov et al., 2002).

Therefore, we need some mechanisms that limit the influence of special interest groups and lobbyists on legislation (Carpenter & Moss, 2013). Since they mostly exert influence through corruption and over-regulation, the same mechanisms explained in the previous sections can limit their influence: sunset clauses, supermajority requirements for new laws, mandatory disclosure for officials, and blockchain technology.

We still need strong institutional safeguards against anti-competitive regulation with careful considerations of when regulation serves legitimate public interests. There can be constitutional provisions that promote competition and prohibit anti-competitive laws and policies (Fox & Trebilcock, 2013; Djankov et al., 2002).

Another promising mechanism is to require a national referendum (Matsusaka, 2005) on any policy or law that might limit competition or interfere with the market. And instead of granting veto power, the constitution can empower the president to call for national referendums to enact or repeal laws. Most likely, the majority opposes policies and laws that disproportionately benefit a few while imposing costs on the majority.

But representatives seek local interests (parochialism)

Geographic representation in the legislature was traditionally viewed as a channel for local voices in governance. However, it can also create conflicts between regional and national interests. To secure re-election, representatives often prioritize their local constituents' needs, sometimes through pork-barrel spending and earmarks, potentially at the expense of broader national welfare (Mayhew, 2004; Evans, 2011; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981).

To address this issue, the president can call for a national referendum on any policy or law that concerns a specific region or regions. Most likely the majority favors policies and laws that benefit the nation, as opposed to those that benefit a region at the expense of the majority of the nation.

Another remedy is to replace local district-based elections with a nationwide approval voting system, which allows voting for multiple choices (Brams & Fishburn, 1978). Under such a system, all candidates run nationally, and each citizen can vote for multiple candidates. The highest voted (approved) candidates win the seats. This shifts the focus from local to national representation and promotes policies that benefit the country as a whole.

Using approval voting would reduce geographic parochialism while still maintaining proportional regional representation through natural demographic distribution (Laslier & Van der Straeten 2008). Research suggests that approval voting tends to favor candidates with wider appeal, leading to policy-making that better serves national interests (Laslier & Sanver, 2010). Additionally, a nationwide approval voting system could eliminate gerrymandering concerns (McGann et al., 2016), as it removes the need for district-based elections altogether.

Meanwhile, using blockchain technology simplifies the adoption of approval voting in elections and referendums, and makes it nearly impossible to track which regions supported which candidates in elections or which choices in referendums. Also, using blockchain significantly lowers the cost of holding referendums, while making them more secure, accessible, and transparent. It enables citizens to cast their votes anonymously from their mobile devices without needing to trust or rely on a central authority, fostering greater trust and participation in direct democratic processes.

But what about the Impossibility Theorems?

The Impossibility Theorems (Arrow, 1951; Muller & Satterthwaite, 1977) show that no voting scheme can satisfy all basic fairness criteria, such as non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and monotonicity. This highlights the inherent limitations of democratic elections. Plurality voting, for example, violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This happens when the entrance (or exit) of a candidate alters the ranking between two other candidates. This violation is often called the “spoiler effect,” a phenomenon with profound implications for democracies. For example, in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Ralph Nader’s candidacy drew votes away from Al Gore, allowing George W. Bush to win Florida and ultimately the presidency (Burden, 2005).

The spoiler effect of the plurality voting tends to create and sustain a two-party dominance, otherwise known as Duverger's Law (Duverger, 1963; Cox, 1997). Voters know that voting for a third-party candidate who can't win is “wasting” their vote. Therefore, they vote strategically to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. For instance, a Green Party supporter might vote Democrat to prevent a Republican victory. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in Nash equilibrium: third parties cannot get enough votes because voters believe they cannot get enough votes.

This explains why the United States, which relies mostly on plurality voting, has sustained two-party dominance for over 150 years, despite periodic voter dissatisfaction with both major parties. In fact, plurality voting can limit political competition, as shown by its effects in both the U.S. and other democracies (Riker, 1962). This problem underscores the importance of exploring alternative collective decision making mechanisms to mitigate the spoiler effect and enable broader political representation.

Fortunately, replacing plurality voting with approval voting can address this issue. Approval voting does not violate IIA (Weber, 1995). It only violates the domain universality condition; it does not allow voters to rank all choices, only approve or disapprove. This violation has less severe consequences, making approval voting a more robust alternative to the commonly used plurality voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978).

The parallel markets mechanism is another alternative that replaces voting with market equilibrium prices to find the optimal choice (Armani, 2020). Once the available choices (candidates) are identified, the mechanism generates conditional shares for each choice. Speculators then trade these shares in parallel, establishing equilibrium prices. The choice with the highest equilibrium price wins, and others are voided and their transactions are refunded. This process can maximize a measure of national prosperity, which can be a combination of economic indicators like GDP and investment indices.

Conclusion

To govern a society effectively, we need a formula or system to aggregate individuals’ preferences into collective decisions. To this end, the rule of the majority stands out as the most viable option, as it avoids chaos and despotism. Historically, submitting to majority rule has been the key to achieving peace and prosperity in many nations. Democracy, at its core, means accepting decisions made by the majority, even when we personally disagree with them.

That said, the rule of the majority is not without its challenges and criticisms. Concerns about fairness, efficiency, and accountability have led to the development of mechanisms to enhance its functionality. This article explores key mechanisms and safeguards designed to balance and refine the rule of the majority without succumbing to the rule of a minority. We try to find governance mechanisms and constitutional provisions that most likely lead to better policies and regulations for the nation they govern.

Representative Democracy: Not all people are experts, but they can elect experts to make informed decisions on their behalf, leveraging their knowledge and expertise.

Time Limit: Regular elections allow voters to reassess and replace representatives and officials when public opinion shifts. This holds the officials accountable to the voters.

Free Speech and Press: Free speech and an independent press inform the electorate, helping them elect the best candidates. This improves transparency and accountability of the elected officials.

Independent Branches: To uphold democratic processes and the law, power must be divided among multiple entities, with independent courts interpreting the laws. This separation of powers creates a system of checks and balances, where each branch can control the others, preventing any single group from dominating.

Federalism: Local matters that only affect local populations should be decided by local governments, empowering people to govern themselves. Generally, the matters that only affect a subset of the population, should be decided by the majority of that subset.

Liberalism: Individuals should have the freedom to make personal choices as long as they do not harm others. This principle promotes individual autonomy while recognizing that liberty must be constrained by the legitimate rights of others in society.

Republicanism: The powers of both central and local governments, even when democratically elected, should be strictly limited to essential duties such as protecting individual rights. Clear constitutional constraints must define these limits to prevent governmental overreach.

Term Limit: To prevent the entrenchment of power and reduce the dominance of career politicians, the constitution can prohibit representatives from serving consecutive terms.

Supermajority: To prevent over-legislation and make the government lean, the constitution can require a supermajority to pass laws, but only a simple majority to repeal them.

Sunset Clause: The constitution can require every law to have an expiration date. This prevents the accumulation of outdated laws and regulations and ensures such laws and regulations are revisited or removed.

Pro-Competition Provisions: The key to a nation’s prosperity and progress lies in free competition in all domains: politics, economy, technology, etc. The constitution can explicitly prohibit anti-competitive and protectionist laws and policies.

Anti-Corruption Provisions: Corruption within the government is the root cause of harmful laws and policies. The constitution can mitigate this by including mandatory disclosure requirements, as well as provisions against favoritism and nepotism.

Referendums: Direct democracy through national referendums empowers the majority to overturn unfair laws and policies that benefit a few at the expense of many. This promotes national interests over favoritism, protectionism, parochialism, and anti-competitive laws and regulations that benefit special interest groups.

Approval Voting: Replacing plurality voting with approval voting can address critical flaws in democratic elections, such as the spoiler effect, two-party dominance, parochialism, earmarks, pork barrels, and gerrymandering. By allowing voters to support multiple candidates, approval voting encourages broader candidate appeal.

Blockchain Technology: Blockchains and smart contracts can help enforce governance rules and facilitate using approval voting in referendums and elections. They can also increase transparency of government transactions, making corruption more detectable. Moreover, a blockchain-based monetary system can potentially automate certain aspects of monetary policy, eliminating the need for central banks.

Artificial Intelligence: AI may become powerful enough to replace many government roles including judges. It will decide court cases more quickly and better than the best human judges. It can consider all evidence, relevant precedents and statutes for each case, obviating the need for lawyers in litigation.

Parallel Markets: This new mechanism uses market equilibrium prices instead of votes to make collective decisions. It creates conditional shares for each choice and allows speculators to trade them. The choice resulting in the highest equilibrium price wins.

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